One year on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Harvard Kennedy School faculty members reflect on how the conflict has changed the way we think about vital global issues and what lessons it has taught us.
February 21, 2023
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, one year ago, shocked the world. The brazen attack was the beginning of the largest land war in Europe since World War II and has led to massive loss of life, enormous displacement of the Ukrainian population, and the decimation of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Beyond the terrible human cost, the war’s effects have reached countless aspects of life and of global politics. It has redrawn geopolitical energy supply lines; strengthened alliances among Western countries and deepened divides with China; put the use of nuclear weapons on the table for the first time in decades; and taught us the importance of leadership in moments of crisis. Experts at Harvard Kennedy School use this moment to explain what we have learned and how this terrible war has changed us.
Accelerating China’s Policies
One year on from Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, China’s position has remained steadfast. Beijing continues to provide Moscow rhetorical support and has reaffirmed that its actions in Ukraine are just, all the while trying to retain a precarious balance that does not alienate western countries and thus render it liable to direct or indirect sanctions. Beijing maintains the narrative that the root cause of the conflict stems from NATO’s expansion, with the West, and in particular the United States, seeking to preserve the post-Cold War order. And the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to depict this as resistance to recognizing that a new global order is emerging, within which China and other nations will play an important role. At the same time, Beijing has been careful to avoid the export of weapons and other vital materials to Russia that might invoke a Western response and has warned Russia against the use of nuclear weapons.
Indeed, there is little reason for China’s support to waver, not only because the relationship with Russia is so closely associated with General Secretary Xi Jinping, but also because there are no rewards for abandoning Russia as it would do nothing to relieve what China sees as its main security threat: containment by the United States. Beijing views the situation positively as it creates a dilemma for Western nations between their Russia and China policies. A Russia weakened by war and Western sanctions is beneficial to China, as long as it does not create instability along the border. Russia is now clearly the junior partner with an increasing dependence on China. Russia’s natural resources provide an expansive strategic backyard that can support China during what is viewed as the long-term competition with the United States. Of particular value is the importation of discounted oil.
The war has also impacted on China’s thinking about reunification with Taiwan. While the CCP retains reunification as the ultimate objective, to be achieved by 2049 at the latest, the actions of the West have created food for thought in Beijing. First, China’s policymakers liken the expansion of NATO in Europe to what they view as the “NATO-ization” of the East, as the United States strengthens alliances. Second, Beijing has been taken aback by the strength and resolve of Western nations to impose sanctions and suffer hardships with their actions against Russia. The CCP presumed that actions would resemble those of 2014, following the annexation of the Crimea, where the West was cautious about harming its own interests with any sanctions imposed. With the strengthening of alliances throughout Asia, Beijing is now aware that any invasion of Taiwan will come at considerable economic cost, in addition to the diplomatic and political fall-out. Third, the difficulty that Russia has faced in a land invasion across a shared border reinforces the difficulty that the Chinese armed forces would face in a seaborne invasion of Taiwan. The forces will need to perfect joint operations, something that will be facilitated by the Chinese reaction to a future potential visit by Speaker McCarthy to Taiwan. Fourth, with the current balance of power in East Asia, any forced reunification with Taiwan is not possible in the near future. The priority for Xi Jinping is to prevent a declaration of independence by Taiwan (not very likely), which would be crippling to his legitimacy. The CCP will take its time to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan, while building up its own military capabilities.
Finally, the war in Ukraine will accelerate Beijing’s policies designed to reduce dependency of the West’s financial systems, technology, and resources. This is witnessed by the large-scale investments in indigenous technology development and attempts to accelerate the internationalization of the Chinese currency and build a yuan-based global commodities trading system—both of which will be difficult to achieve.
Source: Harvard Kennedy School
